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Ch 3: Opening Moves

**Draft but good info**

The sun was just breaking through the trees on the morning of 21, October 1861 when the crisp morning air was shattered by the sound a thousand men crashing through the underbrush.  Sleeping on their arms all night, Companies D, E, G and I of the 33rd Indiana sprang to their positions along the makeshift breastworks that topped the small knoll located about 200 yards in front of the main federal line.  As the Federals waited behind their barricades the men of the 17th TN continued their slow laborious trudge to the summit of Wildcat valley.

Nearing the Federal lines, the Tennesseans raised their rifles and unleashed a devastating volley. The last thing Private Lewis G. McFarren of D company saw was the blossom of powder smoke through the trees.  As he rose to aim his musket, a rifle ball struck him in the head.  He died before his slumping body reached the ground.  Private McFarren had just become the first man killed in the battle of Camp Wildcat and the first “Union” man killed in the battle for Kentucky.

Observing the battle developing from near the main Federal Line the father of Sgt. William Chandler of D company watched the first volley strike.  Mr. Chandler had arrived at Wildcat the night before as a civilian to visit his son and as dawn broke, he was ordered to stay out of the way.  When McFarren was struck down, the elder Chandler strode down amongst the men of D company and snatched up the rifle and cartridge box.  Mr. Chandler raised the still loaded rifle and after taking careful aim, delivered his shot into the massed Tennesseans.  Even though his son Sgt. Chandler would be wounded before the day was out, the Mr. Chandler stood his place in the battle line throughout the action.[1]  Little did these men know, the Battle at Camp Wildcat was only the opening act of a drama which would play out over the next year in the hills and valleys of Eastern Kentucky.

The summer and fall of 1861 was a turbulent time in Kentucky.  With a southern leaning Governor and a centrist if not Union leaning legislature, the political situation was tenuous at best. In the absence of any general consensus in either the government or the population at large as to the question of secession, Kentucky chose to declare its neutrality.  Under this proclamation, the state steadfastly refused to provide troops for either the burgeoning rebellion or to suppress their neighbors to the south.  Kentucky’s neutrality created a situation which was advantageous to both sides of the growing “unpleasantness”.  For the Lincoln government it kept an additional state in the Union, even if only on paper, and it created a buffer between the seceding states and the manufacturing and farming centers of Ohio and Indiana.  Lincoln is famously quoted as saying “I hope that God is on my side, but I must have Kentucky”.

The Confederacy looked on Kentucky’s neutrality with mixed emotions.  Governor Harris of Tennessee was delighted by the move.  With Kentucky maintaining strict neutrality, it placed a whole state between Tennessee and any Federal army thus protecting almost the whole northern border of the state.  The only area where a Union incursion could occur was in the northwest corner at the confluence of the Ohio and the Mississippi Rivers.  The Davis government, however, was not quite as ecstatic.  Aside from Davis’s personal ties to Kentucky, the Confederate Government was keenly aware of the great wealth of resources and raw materials Kentucky represented.  Rich in timber, coal, horse flesh, and most importantly manpower, the south saw Kentucky as a land of opportunity.  With control of Kentucky also came control of the Ohio River.  Much like the Mississippi, the Ohio represented one of the main thoroughfares from which large quantities of goods and troops could be transported across the breadth of several states.  It also created a wide and un-fordable northern border along the majority of the Confederate states.  The closing of the Ohio would have forced Federal troops to cross at only a few choke points which could have been easily defended.  Jefferson Davis chose ultimately to respect Kentucky’s declared neutrality.  He reasoned that by respecting the boarders of Kentucky, he could gradually win the people over to the Confederate cause.

Trouble with Kentucky’s neutrality began in late August 1861. On August 22nd the Federal gunboat Lexington, on patrol on the Mississippi River, sighted the steam boat WB Terry pulling up the wharfs at Paducah, Kentucky. In his report, Commander R.N.Stemble, USN of the Lexington, stated his gunboat arrived opposite Paducah about 7 am where it was observed the Terry flagrantly flying the flag of the Confederacy as it tied up to the docks.  With the Terry “thus being illegally engaged”, Stemble sailed into the anchorage and “made the Terry fast” to his ship.  Assisted by the Eighth Illinois infantry under the command of Col. R.J. Oglesby who were also on the Lexington, the sailors cut out the Terry and towed her across the river to Cairo Illinois.[2]  While enrout to Cairo, Col. Oglesby searched the papers and cargo of the Terry.  In his report on the affair, he observed that the “documents recovered proved she [the Terry] was in Confederate employ”[3].

In retribution for the seizure of the Terry, some Confederate supporters in Kentucky decided to take matters into their own hands.  Docked at Paducah was the US Mail Steamer Samuel Orr.  A group led by Capt. Johnson, formerly of the Terry, Mr. White Fowler, and Mr. A. M. Anderson and supported by between forty and fifty armed citizens seized the Orr.  The would be pirates destroyed the US Mail on the steamer and quickly distributed the cargo across the city, with Capt. Johnson keeping the lions share to compensate himself for the loss of his vessel. The seizure of the Orr and her cargo valued at about $25,000 dollars was seen as a direct affront to Federal authority by the citizens of Kentucky.  The Incident prompted Major General John C. Fremont to state in a letter to the Headquarters of the Western Department “events thus transpired clearly indicating the complicity of the citizens of Kentucky with rebel forces and showing the impracticality of carrying out operations in that direction without involving the Kentucky shore”[4]

With the events surrounding the capture of the Terry fresh in his mind, Major General Leonidas Polk, the Confederate Commander of the second district of Tennessee which encompassed Western Tennessee and the Mississippi River, decided to take matters into his own hands.  Uneasy about what true course Kentucky would take in the war, he dispatched Dr. Jeptha Fowlkes, the editor of the Daily Avalanche newspaper in Memphis, Tennessee, to meet with Kentucky’s Governor Beriah Magoffin in an attempt to discover what Kentucky’s intentions were with regards to the Confederacy.  Polk took this action unilaterally without any consultation with the Davis Government in Richmond.  His actions typify a problem with the overall Confederate Command structure.  Especially early in the war, commanders were constantly making decisions and executing operations without the consent of theater commanders or the national Government.

Under the pretext of keeping his superiors informed, Polk issued a letter to Jefferson Davis on September 1, 1861.  The content of the letter points to his pre-determination to violate Kentucky’s neutrality.  In it he informs the President of his dispatch of Fowlkes to Frankfort but fails to mention any possibility of his movement into western Kentucky. Additionally, he did not mention the response of Magoffin to the meeting which indicates Fowlkes had not returned yet and thus Polk had no real grasp of the complete situation.  These oversights give the impression Polk was aware of the possibility that Jefferson Davis would disapprove his request to move into Kentucky.  By not informing Davis of his desire to make such a move, he carefully avoided the possibility of disobeying a direct order. The neutrality of Kentucky seems to have been no concern to Polk when weighed against the necessity of the defense of the Mississippi River.

In reality Polk was justified in at least some of his fears about Kentucky’s stance on the War. Kentucky’s neutrality was questionable at best.  While the State Legislature was declaring they would have not quarrel with either side of this terrible rendering of souls, the actions of some of its leading citizens and politicians indicated a different course.  In Washington, the States Representatives and Senators were still voting with the Lincoln Government on issues which were deemed harmful to the fledgling Confederacy.   Additionally, the State was allowing resources such as timber and horses to be sold to the Federal Government and government contractors while no such sales were taking place in appreciable quantities with the Confederacy.

Across the Commonwealth, Union and Confederate sympathizers were marshaling to join the fight. In one instance it was reported that in Louisville a company of secession volunteers marched south down one side of the street while a company of Union men trudged north on the other side.  Colonel R.M. Kelly relates a story where a train was headed through central Kentucky with a company of Union Men when it stopped in a town and picked up a company of future Confederates. The officers of both units declared their own neutrality for the remainder of the trip were able to contain the mounting riot.[5] The final insult was rendered when Kentucky allowed the establishment of a Federal recruiting camp located at Hoskins Crossroads in Garrard County on the farm of staunch Unionist Richard M. Robinson, under the guise of “home guards”.  An additional purpose for the camp was to train and equip East Tennessee men for a return to their home. The establishment of this camp was not sanctioned by the State Government yet was not ordered closed either.  In the eyes of the Confederate commanders, an act of omission was as damming as an act of commission.   Camp Dick Robinson was formed by “Union men of Kentucky” while elsewhere within the state the Confederacy was shut out.

This seeming inconsistency in public policy can be interpreted in several ways.  It could be that Kentucky, as still part of the United States, saw it as its duty to continue to support the requisitions of the Federal Government up to, but not including, sending actual state troops to fight.  A case can also be made that merchants supplying the Federal Government had the right, as private citizens, to do business with whomever they choose.  Economically it made sense to do business with the established Federal Government which represented a sure thing in terms of payment versus the rocky Confederacy.  Ultimately, however, many believe the Lincoln Government had no intention of allowing Kentucky to side with the Confederacy and thus treated its neutrality as more of a guideline than a hard fact.

In the face of these issues with Kentucky neutrality, General Polk made a fateful decision.  On the night of September 3, 1861 Confederate forces under the command of General Gideon Pillow landed at Hickman, Kentucky[6].  On a moonless night, the steamboats plowed their way up the Tennessee River.  Night navigation on any river is hazardous at best.  The Spector of unknown shoals and sandbars would disable a boat as surly as a Federal cannonball.  Polk’s ultimate objective was Paducah, Kentucky but his first stop was to be Columbus where he could effectively cut the Mississippi River to Federal traffic.  The trip to Columbus would be hazardous.  It was virtually impossible to make the journey at night and a daylight landing would place his steamboats in danger from bombardment the Federal guns across the river.  Taking these issues into consideration the decision was to land at Hickman, Kentucky and take an overland route to their objective.

The Troops under Pillow quickly advanced and by the 5th were firmly in control of Columbus, Kentucky on the eastern bank of the Mississippi River.  The move across the border into Kentucky was the sole decision of Major General Leonidas K. Polk.  His actions touched off a flurry of telegrams between Polk, Jefferson Davis, and Governor Isham G. Harris of Tennessee.

As Harris awoke on the morning of September 4th, he was shocked by the report of Pillow’s violation of Kentucky’s neutrality. What followed was a confused exchange of missives which attempted to get to the bottom of the actions taken by Polk. In the first telegram, Harris demanded of Polk to know why Pillow was at Hickman, Kentucky.  He further chided Polk that Pillow’s action was “unfortunate, as Davis and I pledged to respect Kentucky’s neutrality”[7].   In his reply, Polk informed Harris that he had directed Pillow to move against Columbus under the powers bestowed on him by President Davis and it was necessary for him to land at Hickman to avoid the Federal guns located across the Mississippi from Columbus.  Additionally, he informed Harris that his movement was accepted by the people of Kentucky in that region and “was also essential to the security of West Tennessee”.[8]

While Polk and Harris were exchanging telegrams, Polk received a telegram from the War Department.  Prior to his contact with Polk, Governor Harris fired off a telegram to President Davis and the Secretary of War L.P. Walker informing them of Polk’s actions and requesting he be immediately ordered to withdraw from Kentucky.  The telegram prompted Walker to dispatch immediate orders to Polk demanding him to “order the prompt withdraw from Kentucky” of all Confederate forces.[9]   Receiving the telegram from Walker, Polk attempted to preempt the orders by contacting Davis personally.  In stating his case for the invasion he informed the President that the Federal forces had moved down the Mississippi and entrenched batteries across from Columbus with designs to cut the river and invade Columbus.  He further stated he had made his move to protect the “southern supporting” citizens of Kentucky from the Federals.  Polk also stated he was willing to withdraw if the Federals would withdraw from the Illinois side of the River.. [10] What he failed to realize was his actions would prompt General Ulysses Grant to abandon his works at Cairo and move to capture Paducah, KY.  Lying up-river from Columbus, the capture of Paducah in essence rendered Columbus useless to the Confederacy.[11]

The flood of correspondence between all the parties provides insight into the disjointed lines of communication and responsibility within the early Confederacy.  Shortly after receiving Polk’s telegram, Davis replied to him stating among other things “the necessity justifies the action”.  This is directly contradictory to the letter received on the 5th of September by Harris from Secretary of War Walker in which he states that Polk’s movement into Kentucky was not authorized and he had been ordered to withdraw.  The issuance of this telegram adds additional weight to the argument that the Confederacy had not truly established a firm policy on Kentucky’s neutrality and the overall lines of communication were confusing at best.

As the war of words dragged on over the invasion of Kentucky, Polk began to present what he considered as irrefutable evidence to support his actions.  On September 5th, as part of his justification, he forwarded to Davis a letter received from Mr. George C. Taylor of Columbus.  In the letter Mr. Taylor makes some severe claims against the Federal Authorities. His note claimed that when Kentucky chose neutrality, the South had accepted this as the right of the individual state but the Federal Government has “repudiated” this position. He claimed “[Federal Government] repeatedly violated the neutrality of Kentucky and scoffed at those who trusted it for protection”.  With Federal troops at Cairo the people of Columbus, at least the Confederate sympathizers, could only surmise that the army was set to violate the states neutrality. [12]

To round out his list of complaints to justify the Confederate invasion of Kentucky, Taylor sites an incident surrounding Capt. M.H. Wright and his Columbus Rangers.  According to Taylor, the Rangers were a company of “friends” which engaged in drill, camping, and hunting together.  The incident occurred when the Rangers had moved northward along the Kentucky side of the Mississippi River north of Columbus and were arrested by a party of two hundred armed men who landed from across the river.  Taylor cited this as a clear violation of the declared neutrality by Federal authorities. He also stated that the Federal embargo of Louisville against goods from or headed to the south was in essence waging economic warfare on the Kentucky citizens.  Throughout his lengthy correspondence Taylor failed to mention the numerous steamers along the wharfs of Columbus flying the new Confederate national flag.[13]  When questioned about this breach of Kentucky neutrality, Polk recited a litany of abuses of Kentucky neutrality by the Lincoln Government including those mentioned above.  More importantly he states, the Federal forces under command of Ulysses S. Grant were poised to cross the Mississippi and seize Columbus for themselves.  Having already placed batteries on the Missouri side of the Mississippi, the capture of Columbus would have effectively closed the Mississippi to all river traffic for the confederacy[i].

With the wires between Western Tennessee and Richmond, Virginia staying hot with messages, Polk determined to attempt a conciliatory effort with Kentucky.  On September 8, 1861 he issued a letter to Governor Magoffin outlining the reasoning for his actions.  He stated he had “reliable information” the Federals were preparing to invade Kentucky and his move was preemptory and required for the safety of the Confederacy.  In an effort to rest the fears of Kentucky, Polk offered to withdraw his troops from Kentucky provided the Federals remove their troops and batteries from across the river while making no mention of the occupation of Paducah  by the Federals which had occurred on the 5th of September. .[14]

Polk’s attempt at diplomacy backfired.  On the 9th he received a strongly worded letter from Mr. John M Johnston, Chairman of Committee for the Kentucky State Senate, in which he replied stating among other things that the people of Kentucky were surprised and deeply offended that the south was the first to violate the state’s neutrality .  Additionally, he informed Polk of the resolution passed by the Senate requiring  the Governor to issue a proclamation ordering  the immediate withdraw of Confederate forces from Kentucky.[15]  While there is no mention of it, a copy of the letter was undoubtedly sent to both Tennessee Governor Harris and President Davis.  On the 13th of September, Polk informed President Davis of the letter received at his headquarters on the 12th from Frankfort.  He officially informed Davis that the Kentucky Senate had required Governor Magoffin to issue a “proclamation ordering off Confederate Troops”.  In his initial reply, Davis reminded Polk of the Confederate Governments desire to treat Kentucky with respect.  He also warned Polk that his occupation of Columbus must be purely defensive in nature and “limited by necessity”. [16]

Polk’s beach of Kentucky’s neutrality set the stage for the opening actions of the campaign for the Cumberland Gap.  On 9, September 1861, Confederate Forces under the Command of General Felix K. Zollicoffer crossed the Cumberland Mountains at Cumberland Gap and moved into Kentucky.  The crossing into Kentucky was not a made in concert with the operations of Polk against Columbus, but rather a calculated move to take advantage of the natural fortifications provided by the Cumberland Mountains and the three other ridges which make up this imposing geologic feature.  Zollicoffer, who was tasked with the protection of eastern Tennessee, was keenly aware of the danger imposed by a Federal force occupying the heights of the Cumberland Range.[17]  Should the Unionists take control and fortify the ridges and steep valleys, they could launch attacks into eastern Tennessee with impunity.   As he was to find out on the ridges above the Rockcastle River, it is virtually impossible to dislodge an enemy force fortified on steep rocky terrain without sever loss of life.  Zollicoffer had an appreciation for both the tactical and strategic importance of the region and thus decided to march on the Federals and occupy the hills cementing himself behind the massive rock formations.

Zollicoffer’s move into Kentucky and the Proclamation by Magoffin prompted Simon Bolivar Buckner, Mexican War Veteran and former Adjutant General of Kentucky’s State Guard, to write to General Samuel Cooper who was serving as the Adjutant-General of the Confederate States of America.  In the letter, Buckner pleaded with Cooper to order Zollicoffer to stop at the Kentucky State line.  He was confident that if the Confederacy were to withdraw from Kentucky, he could rally thousands of “neutral Union men” in the state to expel the Federals. He supported his argument by pointing out that with the Federal army holding Paducah, the Confederate position at Columbus had been rendered useless.  Buckner also warned Cooper that if the Confederacy delayed it’s withdraw, it could not remain stagnant.  They must press forward which, in his opinion, the Confederacy was not ready for[18].

The back and forth between all the parties came to a head on the 15th of September when President Davis informed Polk by telegram that his information about Kentucky had been considered and based on the evidence his encroachment was approved. Although Governor Harris considered the Confederate invasion of Kentucky a detriment to the Confederate cause, the die had been cast and events had proceeded beyond the point of being recalled.  With Polk in West Kentucky and Zollicoffer in Eastern Kentucky, the Confederacy was now firmly committed to forcing the Union out of Kentucky and bringing what they considered a sister state into their fold.

Had Zollicoffer stayed at Cumberland Gap, he would have been able to hold it against anything the Federals threw at him.  But, as is often the folly of great intentions, Zollicoffer decided to continue his advance into Kentucky instead of simply fortifying the Gap itself.  Striking north with his 5,400 troops, the Confederates covered the twenty-five miles to the crossing of the Cumberland River at Cumberland Ford in about ten days.  Arriving at the ford, they scattered a few bands of local Union Home Guard posted to protect the crossing.  Stopping to rest, Zollicoffer established Camp Buckner at the ford.  The respite for his division was not a lengthy one.  Leaving a small guard at the ford, Zollicoffer’ s army turned northwest along the Wilderness Road moving first to Flat Lick, Kentucky then on to Barboursville.

By 20, October 1862, Zollicoffer’s Division was 4 miles north of London, Kentucky.  Federal troops, which were hurried to the area from Camp Dick Robinson, were occupying fortified positions on the south side of the Rockcastle River about 8 miles to his front.[19] The Federals were tasked with defending the crossing of the Rockcastle River and obstructing the Confederate advance.  The ground chosen by Colonel Theophilous Garrard, the initial commander of the position, was a ridge about three miles above a ford on the Rockcastle River where the Wilderness Road crossed the ridge.  The position was initially defended by the 7th Kentucky Volunteer Infantry which numbered about 900 men.  After gathering intelligence from local residents and scouting parties, Garrard became concerned the men of the 7th KY were woefully inadequate to turn back the Confederate advance.  In a letter dated October 19, 1862 from Camp Wildcat, Garrard informed General Thomas at Camp Dick Robinson that unless he receives reinforcements he plans to retreat before the enemy. In the letter, he states that he has fortified the road and the surrounding hills and torn up the bridge but “They have enough {troops} to come at this position from every direction” [20]

On the same day he received Garrard’s letter, Thomas assigned Brigadier General Albin Scheopf to command all the forces at Wildcat. Arriving at the post on the 20th, he was accompanied by enough troops to more than triple the Federal forces defending the position. Scheoph’s brigade included the 33rd Indiana, the 17th, 14th, and 13th Ohio, and battery B of the 1st Ohio Light Artillery.  These forces, in conjunction with Garrard’s 3rd Kentucky[ii] and the 1st & 2nd East Tennessee Infantry provide a powerful blocking force.  It should be noted that had Zollicoffer moved more rapidly and struck Garrard on the 19th instead of the 21st of October, the federals would in all likelihood have been swept aside and the entire tactical situation in Kentucky would have changed.  Once across the Rockcastle River, the terrain rapidly falls off to low hills and ridges giving way to farmland.  This would have been easy to maneuver through and may have ended with an early Confederate occupation of the Bluegrass Region.

On the 21st of October, Zollicoffer commenced his advance to throw the Federals off the ridge blocking the Wilderness Road. The approach to the Federal entrenchments was comprised of two, long, heavily wooded valleys. The route of advance was steep and arduous with visibility limited to patches of terrain where no tree cover existed.  In his after action report, Col. John Coburn of the 33rd IN. states “..in 10 minutes more of the enemy appeared in front of our position……they soon came near us under cover of a wood, which entirely concealed their approach until we were apprised of it by the firing of musketry…”[21] .  Coburn had deployed his four companies of the 33rd on a small knoll about one half mile forward of the main Federal line.  The 350 men of the 33rd were in the process of entrenching on the knoll when they began to receive fire from Confederate Skirmishers.

The 17th Tennessee under the command of Col. Tazewell Newman lead the initial assault on the Federal positions.  Throwing out a strong line of skirmishers, the regiment advanced in relative concealment to within about 80 yards of the 33rd’s position.  On reaching the base of the knoll, the 17th began to encounter rifle fire.  Thinking the troops in front of them were men of Col. Rains regiment, whom they were supposed to be following, Newman held his fire and continued to advance.[iii]  When the Tennesseans’ were about 40 yards of the Federal breastworks, Newman discovered his mistake.  The 17th TN unleashed a heavy volley which rocked the 33rd IN back on their haunches.  The Tennesseans kept up a heavy musket fire for about 25 minutes.[22]

Seeing the Indiana troops were being pressed hard, General Scheopf ordered four companies of the 17th Ohio forward to shore up the position.  The Ohio troops under the command of ______ pushed forward and began to form on the flank of the 33rd.  Alert to the possible envelopment of his line, Newman proceeded to throw companies farther out to the right, around the knoll, to ward off any attempt to flank the Tennessee line.[23]

The battle for the knoll had now raged for almost an hour and fifteen minutes. Faced with mounting resistance, Newman considered his options.  In his determination, retreating would lead to a heavy loss of life and thus he ordered the 17th TN to attempt a bayonet charge in order to break the Federal line.  On his order, four companies surged forward toward the works.  In his report, Newman stated that some of the Tennessee troops breached the Federal breastworks and entered them; however, Col Coburn of the 33rd stated they came “within a few rods” of the works and were beaten off.[24]  Regardless of whether Newman’s Regiment breached the works, they quickly found themselves exhausted, short of ammunition, and without any support and were forced to retire leaving 11 dead and 34 wounded.

About 2 PM, Zollicoffer made a second attempt to take the heights.  This second assault was to be made by a much larger force.  Aligned astride the Wilderness Road, Zollicoffer placed the 15th Mississippi on the west of the road as the left flank of the battle line with the 20th Tennessee pushing strait up the road, and the 11th Tennessee to the East of the Wilderness Road forming the right flank.  The 11th was supported by elements of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry (CS) dismounted.  The 29th Tennessee was to replace the 17th in another attempt to dislodge the Federals from the spur.  As the advance began it quickly became evident that the Confederates were marching into a funnel.  The terrain caused the two flank regiments to drift toward the center which was occupied by Wilderness Road.  This drifting of units caused regiments to crowd each other thus limiting their ability to move and intermingling commands.  Moving up the valley they came under rifle fire from the remaining four companies of the 33rd Indiana and the Kentucky home guard on the western slope of the ridge.  At the head of the draw where the road crossed the ridge the 7th Kentucky was firmly entrenched.  Along the eastern flank and the troublesome spur stood the remainder of the 33rd Indiana, three companies of the 14th Ohio and 4 companies of the 17th Ohio. [25]

The Second assault on the heights was similarly unsuccessful.  As darkness began to fall the action for the day ceased.   With the ridge and the road fully in Federal hands, Zollicoffer decided to discontinue the action.  His troops were exhausted, low on ammunition, almost out of food and now facing a much larger Federal force than he had originally anticipated.  Loading the wounded into the available wagons, the Confederates began a slow retrograde movement back toward the Cumberland Gap. The route of march they followed was much the same as their advance. Unfortunately for Zollicoffer’s troops, during the advance the Confederate troops had ravaged the area looking for forage to supplement their meager food supplies.  The deficiency of available forage resulted in a long hungry walk south.

[i] Unfortunately, there is no tangible evidence that Grant was going to violate the Kentucky neutrality.  Grant did not move into Kentucky until September 5, 1861, two days after Polk’s Move.    Polk’s

Unilateral decision was the tipping point which brought Kentucky into the war on the Federal Side.

[ii] Garrard’s 3rd KY will eventually be re-designated the 7th KY infantry.  It will remain the 7th KY until 1864 when it will be reorganized into the 7th KY Veteran Volunteers as it absorbs the remnants of the 19th KY and the 22nd KY

[iii] The dense tree Cover and uneven terrain of their advance caused the Confederate units to shift positions and become displaced.

[1] (McBride 1900, 21)

[2] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 178)

[3] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 177-178)

[4] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 176-177)

[5] (Kelly 1956, 377)

[6] (OR S-1, Vol IV, 180)

[7] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 180)

[8] Ibid

[9] Ibid

[10] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 181)

[11] (Kelly 1956, 379) (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 189-190)

[12] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 181-182)

[13] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 183-184)

[14] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 185)

[15] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 185-186)

[16] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 189)

[17] (OR S-1, Vol IV, 194-195)

[18] (OR S-1, Vol IV 1880-1901., 189-190)

[19] (OR S-1, Vol IV, 209-210)

[20] (OR S-1, Vol IV, 311-312)

[21] (OR S-1, Vol IV, 209-210)

[22] (OR S-1, Vol IV, 213-214)

[23] Ibid

[24] (OR S-1, Vol IV, 208)

[25] Ibid

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